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in East Asia. As this paper demonstrates, President Trump’s blunt demand that allies pay their
“fair share” for U.S. military protection may lead to doubts internationally regarding the strength
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has swelled to become a full­fledged social and racial justice transformative movement that may
affect U.S. foreign policy. While the Trump presidency has thusly cracked open a domestic and
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box, as this paper further demonstrates, by burdening the U.S. federal government with the
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Key words : International Relations, Security Studies, U.S. Politics
────────────────────────────────────────────
*Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University
― ３７ ―
I. Introduction
The San Francisco System, based on the Treaty of San Francisco signed by Japan and the
allied powers at the San Francisco Conference in 1951, played a vital role in supporting economic
development in East Asia following the end of the Second World War. This system has also been
colloquially called the hub­and­spokes system on account of the U.S. serving as the hub, and
attached to this hub are spokes in the form of bilateral security treaties with several regional powers,
including Japan, the Philippines, Australia, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Thailand, and the
Republic of China (Taiwan) until 1979, after which time the United States adopted a policy of
strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan. This hub­and­spokes system, coupled with various other
strategic partnerships in the form of security agreements and defense relationships, helped America’s
allies in East Asia limit their defense expenditures and helped avert costly arms races, and thereby
allowed countries in the region to focus on economic development. Although diplomatic relations
have expanded considerably over the decades following the establishment of the San Francisco
System, especially with the formation of multilateral arrangements like the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the network of
U.S. military alliances and security agreements continues to function as the cornerstone of East
Asian regional security.
The September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the subsequent Global War on Terror that led
the United States to focus on the Middle East, contributed to a weakening of America’s dominant
position in East Asia. Most notably, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006, and the People’s Republic of China (China) underwent rapid
gains in military strength and capabilities. President Barack Obama sought to re­affirm the U.S.
position in the region when he took office by announcing that his administration was pivoting
America’s foreign policy focus to the Asia Pacific. One of the most notable pieces of this pivot was
the Trans­Pacific Partnership (TPP), which included twelve countries that entered into a trade
agreement that was designed to reduce their economic dependence on China. When Hillary Clinton
ran for president in 2016 and enjoyed a comfortable lead in the polls throughout most of the
campaign against her Republican opponent, Donald Trump, it seemed certain that Obama’s former
Secretary of State would prevail and oversee what would have largely been a continuation of his
foreign policy agenda. Polls had narrowed by election day, however, and Trump pulled off one of
the most stunning electoral victories in U.S. presidential history―and his administration’s foreign
policy agenda quickly proved to be a radical departure from his predecessor’s approach.
Whereas presidential transitions from one party to another following an election previously
resulted in relatively moderate shifts that still largely lay within a centrist ideological framework, the
Trump administration immediately challenged the protocols, decorum, and established principles of
governance that have guided past administrations, regardless of party affiliation, and in so doing
cracked open a foreign and domestic policy pandora’s box that is ushering in a transformative
period in American history. In the realm of foreign policy, President Trump has criticized America’s
vast system of alliances, bluntly demanding that allies pay their fair share for U.S. military
protection, which may leave a lasting impact on the way allies and adversaries alike view the
strength of the U.S. commitment to security agreements. Domestically, the backlash against the
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Trump presidency has been intense and persistent, and it all came to a head in 2020 when protests
surged across the country following the death of George Floyd. Unlike past incidents of protests and
civil unrest, this wave of widespread social unrest appears to be a movement that will have a
transformative impact on a wide range of American institutions and policies, which could include
foreign policy.
While it is the Trump presidency that appears to have cracked open this domestic and
diplomatic pandora’s box, the rampant spread of SARS­CoV­2 in the United States has blown the
lid right off of this proverbial pandora’s box. This new coronavirus has compounded the two
previously mentioned challenges by having a disastrous impact on the U.S. economy and triggering
the largest federal government budget deficit since World War II. Furthermore, the national response
to this pandemic has also revealed how America’s highly politicized atmosphere makes it
extraordinarily difficult for the government to formulate an effective coordinated response to a
national emergency. All three of these factors taken together, as this paper will ultimately show,
may lead America’s chief adversaries to call into question whether or not the United States
possesses the political wherewithal and material capacity to follow through on security agreements
in East Asia. This perception of vulnerability, whether accurate or not, may thereby undermine the
U.S. military’s role in the region as a genuine military deterrent to any attempts to alter the status
quo by force.
II. President Trump’s Intense Focus on Allies Paying “Their Fair Share”
President Trump proceeded to enact his “America First” foreign policy vision right from the
outset of his presidency. “From this moment on, it’s going to be America First,” he declared in his
inaugural address, adding that “every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs,
will be made to benefit American workers and their families.”1) Sometimes dubbed the Trump
Doctrine, foreign policy under President Trump has been a repudiation of grand strategies based on
the principles of liberal hegemony that have guided post­Cold War U.S. foreign policy.2) In his quest
to put “America First,” Trump’s foreign policy has at times been erratic, with regard to both allies
and adversaries alike. While Trump’s impact on U.S. foreign policy touches on a wide array of
topics, this section will focus on one in particular : the depth of President’s Trump animosity
toward allies on the issue of appropriate payment for U.S. military protection.
North Korea serves as perhaps the most high­profile example of Trump’s dealings with U.S.
adversaries. President Trump responded to North Korean threats against the United States in 2017
by publicly warning : “North Korea best not make more threats to the United States … they will be
met with fire, fury, and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before.”3)
Trump clearly eschewed diplomatic protocol by employing such menacing language, but soon
afterward, however, he participated in a series of face­to­face meetings with North Korea’s leader
that were held on ostensibly friendly terms. In Singapore, in 2018, he met with the North Korean
leader and held amicable talks, which led to some optimism that this summit might mark the
beginning of negotiations to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. In 2019, in Vietnam, Trump met
once again with North Korea’s leader for another round of talks. Though President Trump abruptly
ended the summit and immediately returned to the United States when it became clear that an
agreement on the removal of sanctions could not be reached, he noted that “this wasn’t a walk away
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like you get up and walk out … this was very friendly … we shook hands … when we walked
away, it was a very friendly walk.”4) Trump then met with North Korea’s leader yet again in 2019,
this time in the Korean peninsula’s demilitarized zone. This meeting was brief, but clearly had a
positive tone, and it also led to a historic moment when Trump became the first sitting U.S.
president to set foot in North Korea.5) Whether or not these overtures will ultimately lead to
progress on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula remains to be seen, but what is noteworthy here is
the way that Trump so eagerly pursued amicable diplomatic relations with an American adversary,
one that had recently made open threats against the United States.
With regard to allies, Germany may represent the best example of President Trump at times
seemingly refusing to pursue amicable diplomatic relations, and instead persisting with a more
antagonistic approach. He has repeatedly criticized U.S. allies in general for not paying “their fair
share,” with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) being the primary target of his
criticisms, and Europe’s largest economic power in particular seemingly drawing most of his ire. In
his first in­person meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Trump stated at the
start of their news conference that he strongly supports NATO, but then bluntly added that “many
nations owe vast sums of money from past years, and it is very unfair to the United States―these
nations must pay what they owe.”6) At the heart of this issue is the 2014 Wales Declaration on the
Transatlantic Bond, which committed each NATO member state to increase its own national defense
budget to 2% of GDP within a decade. Germany has declared that it will not be able to meet this
obligation, and will instead aim for 2031 to achieve this goal.7) However, likely in an effort to
appease President Trump, Germany has agreed to increase its share of contributions to NATO’s
budget from 14.8% to 16%, while the U.S. has been able to reduce its share of NATO’s budget
from 22% to 16%.8) This shift, however, is widely viewed as symbolic since it pertains only to
NATO’s relatively small annual administrative budget of $2.5 billion.9) Trump has therefore
remained steadfast in his quest to get Germany to pay more for defense, and so he ultimately
decided in 2020 to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Germany from 36,000 to 24,000. Trump
made it clear that this decision was in response to Germany’s failure to pay more for defense,
stating that the U.S. is “reducing the force because they’re not paying bills … if they start paying
bills, I would rethink.”10)
Clearly the issue of allies paying their fair share is so important to President Trump that he has
been willing to strain ties with a key U.S. ally, while he has been so determined to pursue peaceful
relations with North Korea that he was willing to overlook its blunt threats against the United
States. This issue of allies paying their fair share according to Trump’s valuation is especially
worrisome for Japan and South Korea, given the critical role U.S. bases play in each country’s
national security strategy. Trump had already set the stage for questioning the costs of bases in East
Asia during the 2016 presidential campaign, when he suggested that it might be beneficial for Japan
and South Korea to build their own nuclear weapons.11) As president, according to former National
Security Advisor John Bolton, Trump wanted to get Japan and South Korea to pay more for U.S.
bases, and he was willing to threaten a U.S. withdrawal in order to pressure each country to pay
more. As Bolton quotes the President : “that puts you in a very strong bargaining position.”12) With
regard to Japan specifically, President Trump was seeking to have the country increase its payment
from $2.5 billion to $8 billion annually, though Bolton notes that “only Trump knew what payment
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would satisfy him, so there was no point trying to guess what the ‘real’ number was.”13)
The reality is that burden­sharing agreements have been points of contention long before
President Trump took office. This issue came up during his predecessor’s first term in office, for
instance, when Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta pressed NATO allies in 2011 to increase their
defense contributions, warning that failing to do so could result in a “hollowing out” of the NATO
alliance.14) However, the way that President Trump has further elevated this issue by persistently and
bluntly criticizing U.S. for allies not paying “their fair share” for defense, and the way that
questions about the value of U.S. military protection came to the forefront during the early stages of
his presidency, will likely heighten the standing of burden­sharing agreements with Japan, South
Korea, and NATO countries as political issues. In the case of European national defense spending,
for example, a Pew Research Center poll shows that 45% of Americans in 2017 believed that
Europeans should spend more on their national defense.15) Although that percentage had dropped to
35% in 2019,16) the massive federal government budget deficits in response to COVID­19, as will be
discussed in Section III, could well end up leading public opinion to swing back toward the view
that allies should spend more on their own national defense.
III. The Rise of Social Justice in Mainstream America
One of the most prominent racial justice issues in America is law enforcement, especially with
regard to instances when police officers are accused of using excessive force against African
American civilians. It is a long­standing issue that has provoked outrage on a number of occasions.
Up until recently, the videotaped beating of Rodney King, an African American civilian, by a group
of White police officers in 1991, and the subsequent week­long riots in Los Angeles, likely
represented the most famous instance of public outrage regarding allegations of abuse of power by
police officers dealing with members of the African American community. Beginning in 2014,
instances of police officers using deadly force while attempting to arrest African Americans have
increasingly gained widespread media attention, while at the same time a sustained protest
movement has been growing in the United States in the form of Black Lives Matter (BLM). The
spark that pushed BLM into the national spotlight was the 2014 fatal shooting of an African
American man named Michael Brown by a White police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. Protests and
even riots broke out in the city and lasted for approximately two weeks, followed by periodic
protests in the months that followed.17)
Several additional fatal shootings of African Americans by police officers have continued to
push the issue of policing and racial justice into the national conversation. Donald Trump’s
candidacy in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with his focus on law and order and his calls for
stricter immigration regulations, seemed to exacerbate existing tensions. Trump’s victory over
Clinton triggered wave after wave of protests, not only on the streets, but in the entertainment
world, the press, and in the political arena. It was also at this time in 2016 that Colin Kaepernick,
an American professional football player, began to sit during pre­game performances of the
American national anthem, the Star­Spangled Banner, in response to racial justice issues and
policing in the United States. Usually performed live before every major sporting event, professional
athletes have customarily stood during performances of the Star­Spangled Banner, and so his refusal
to stand for the national anthem sparked controversy. Eventually he shifted from sitting to kneeling
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during the national anthem, and a number of his fellow players also began to kneel during the
anthem, and some athletes in other sports began to kneel as well. The controversy surrounding the
issue of kneeling during the anthem was a concern for professional sports leagues and some team
owners, given that the backlash from some fans could hurt ticket sales and television viewership.
Following the 2016 season, Kaepernick was not signed to a contract by any team, widely viewed to
be due to the controversy his presence on the football field would generate. Despite his absence
from professional sports as a player, other players followed his example and continued to kneel
during the anthem, thus keeping the controversy alive, with his supporters arguing that it is
inappropriate to stand for the anthem when there is racial injustice taking place, and with his
detractors arguing that it is disrespectful to the American flag and to the troops who have fought for
America’s security.
Up until 2020, BLM was an emerging movement, and kneeling for the anthem in professional
sports was controversial. This changed dramatically following an incident on May 25, 2020, when
an African American man named George Floyd died while being arrested by Minneapolis police
officers, and images were released that showed a White police officer restraining Floyd by kneeling
on his neck.18) The outrage was swift, and BLM’s influence in America surged, quickly becoming
one of the most potent political forces in the United States. Over the following weeks, millions
throughout the United States took to the streets in protest, which at times turned violent, and a piece
in The New York Times in July of 2020 even proclaimed that “Black Lives Matter may be the
largest movement in U.S. history.”19) Iconic buildings posted messages, or were lit up, or went dark
at various times in response to Floyd’s death. Businesses posted messages in support of BLM on
their websites, and Democratic senators held a moment of silence to honor Floyd. In the sports
world, the controversy regarding individual players kneeling not only abated, but teams and leagues
directly supported BLM and player protests. For instance, opening day of Major League Baseball’s
COVID­19­shortened season featured “BLM” stenciled on the pitcher’s mound.20) Another incident
shortly afterward that involved a police officer shooting an African American man even resulted in
professional baseball, basketball, and hockey leagues cancelling games in protest.
The unrest following the death of George Floyd quickly moved from protests on the streets and
symbolic acts in the sports and entertainment world, to real change. Growing calls to “defund the
police” actually resulted in some cities significantly cutting police budgets. New York City, for
example, cut $1 billion from the New York Police Department’s $6 billion budget, and the city
council has reportedly expressed a desire for even greater cuts to the department’s budget.21) Calls
for change have gone well beyond the issue of race and allegations of abuse of power by police
officers, quickly growing to cover a wide array of historical racial justice issues. Statues of historical
figures connected to slavery in the United States have been torn down, as well as statues of
founding figures in North American history, including Christopher Columbus.22) Buildings named
after American leaders who espoused racists views have been re­named, with Princeton University,
for instance, removing U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s name from its school of public policy.23)
While much of this social unrest relates to domestic issues, U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. military
may not be immune from the sweeping societal changes taking place in America. For example, calls
to rename military bases named after Confederate leaders intensified following Floyd’s death.
Despite President Trump rejecting these calls and Republicans in the Senate holding a majority, the
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Senate approved, with a vote of eighty­six to fourteen,24) a National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2021, which includes provisions to rename ten military bases named after Confederate
military leaders.25) This may be just the beginning, for the ongoing domestic unrest in the United
States could lead to calls to reduce funding for the military and calls to re­evaluate the role of the
American military presence abroad. For instance, the military’s role in westward expansion and the
displacement of Native Americans, and the impact of its campaigns on foreign civilians during some
of America’s wars abroad in the past, will all likely face intensifying scrutiny as protests continue to
raise racial justice issues from America’s past.
These developments should not be seen as short­term, momentary developments that will abate
with the end of the Trump presidency. Rather, Trump’s ascendence to the presidency has ignited
previously existing unresolved issues, and the intensity of the ensuing and escalating social unrest
indicates that for large segments of the population, now that these issues have come out into the
open, a return to the pre­Trump status quo is unacceptable. Reinforcing this point is the leftward
shift in the Democratic Party following the 2018 mid­terms. The Green New Deal, a non­binding
resolution proposed by Representative Alexandria Ocasio­Cortez (Democrat, New York) and Senator
Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), is an ambitious proposal that would transform the U.S.
government’s budget and the U.S. economy in general. Some of its proposals include : “Meeting
100 percent of the power demand in the United States through clean, renewable, and zero­emission
energy sources” within ten years, along with numerous others goals ranging from guaranteeing jobs
with a “family­sustaining wage” to “providing all people of the United States with … high­quality
health care.”26) This was initially seen as the product of the fringe left in the Democratic Party, with
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi derisively making reference to it as “the green dream or
whatever they call it,” and dismissively suggesting that “nobody knows what it is, but they’re for it
right?”27) Yet, by the time Democrats held debates for the Democratic presidential nomination,
virtually all candidates supported the Green New Deal to some extent, at least in principle. The
biggest criticism of the Green New Deal is that fiscal reality obviously makes such an ambitious set
of goals far too costly to implement. However, the United States has spent approximately $6.4
trillion on post­9/11 wars, from the end of 2001 to the 2020 fiscal year.28) This figure is based on
the $5.4 trillion in total appropriations for spending on war activities abroad and Department of
Homeland Security expenses, and at least $1 trillion for future expenses to care for veterans from
post­9/11 wars. Green New Deal Democrats can thus draw on such information to make the
argument that foreign wars and at least some part of the defense budget are misplaced expenses that
could otherwise help fund parts of their new vision, and in so doing pull other politicians further left
on the issue of defense spending.
IV. The Impact of SARS-CoV-2 on the U.S. Economy and Society
The emergence of SARS­CoV­2 in early 2020 wreaked havoc on the world, and the impact on
the United States has been profound on an economic, political, and societal level. By the middle of
September of 2020, the United States had over 6.6 million confirmed cases of COVID­19 and over
195,000 confirmed deaths from the disease, both figures the highest in the world at the time. Even
when adjusted for population size, the United States had the eleventh highest death rate in the world
in per capita terms with 59.88 deaths per hundred thousand.29) As cases of COVID­19 surged in
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March, the United States began to effectively shut down. The impact on the economy was
disastrous, as the United States saw a dramatic drop in real gross domestic product (GDP), with real
GDP decreasing by 5.0% in the first quarter of 2020, and then decreasing by an estimated 31.7% in
the second quarter of 2020.30) Jobless claims skyrocketed as businesses laid off or furloughed
employees, necessitating massive government spending. At the end of the 2018 fiscal year, the U.S.
federal government budget deficit was just over $779 billion,31) but by the end of July of 2020 the
deficit had surged to $2.8 trillion.32) Moreover, the U.S. federal government budget deficit for fiscal
2020 is projected by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to end up being approximately $3.7
trillion, which at 17.9% of GDP, the CBO notes, would make it the largest U.S. government budget
deficit since 1945.33) The CBO has further projected that the fiscal 2021 federal government budget
deficit will be $2.1 trillion, again significantly higher than average.34) This represents a substantial
addition to America’s sizeable debt burden, which at the end of July of 2020 reached approximately
$26.5 trillion.35)
Compounding this problem is the political and social chaos in the United States throughout
Trump’s presidency, and the way that it intensified dramatically during this pandemic to the point
that critical decisions have been almost immediately politicized. For instance, President Trump
issued a proclamation on January 31, 2020, that banned the entry of travellers from China, with the
exception of U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and select categories of people who are related to U.
S. citizens or U.S. residents.36) While running for the Democratic presidential nomination, Joe Biden
posted a tweet shortly after the ban that seemed to suggest that Trump’s decision to impose a travel
ban on China was the product of “xenophobia” and “hysteria,”37) though he later denied that this
tweet was in reference to the China travel ban. The political turmoil during the pandemic has been
extensive, with battles largely waged along ideological lines. Democratic politicians have essentially
placed all of the blame for the spread of the virus on President Trump, while many Republican
lawmakers have heavily criticized what they see as an overzealous use of emergency powers to
enact mask mandates and lockdown orders in Democrat­controlled states. Even the basic issue of
wearing a mask in order to prevent the spread of the coronavirus has been largely politicized.38)
President Trump and many Republican lawmakers have eschewed wearing a mask in public,
whereas Democratic politicians have appeared in public wearing a mask far more frequently. Even
in the general population there appears to be a notable difference along party lines, as demonstrated
by a June 2020 Pew Research Center poll, which found that 76% of Democrats or those who lean
Democrat wore a mask in stores “all or most of the time,” whereas only 53% of Republicans or
those who lean Republican answered the same.39)
U.S. armed forces have not been immune from the effects of the coronavirus, with the situation
of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt serving as a prime example of the extent that COVID­19 has been
able to impact the military. In a leaked letter that was published by the San Francisco Chronicle,
the captain of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, Brett Crozier, asked Navy officials for assistance in
response to coronavirus infections “accelerating” on the ship.40) Crozier’s letter, dated March 30,
begins confidently : “if required the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT would embark all assigned
Sailors, set sail, and be ready to fight and beat any adversary that dares challenge the US or our
allies.” However, his letter goes on to reveal that “the spread of the disease is ongoing and
accelerating.” His letter then argues that “as war is not imminent, we recommend pursuing the peace
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time end state,” and proposes removing most personnel to isolate them while keeping approximately
10% of the crew aboard to maintain the ship. Having over 4,000 personnel remain aboard as the
infection was spreading, Crozier’s letter adds, “is an unnecessary risk and breaks faith with those
Sailors entrusted to our care.” On April 2, shortly after the leaked letter was published, the captain
was relieved of duty. According to the Acting Secretary of the Navy at the time, Thomas Modly,
Crozier sent the letter by e­mail over an unsecured network and it was copied to multiple other
people.41)
Crozier being relieved of command was immediately politicized, with Democrats criticizing the
decision and calling for investigations. Controversy then swelled on April 5 when Modly addressed
the ship’s crew in person and disparaged Crozier. “If he didn’t think, in my opinion, that this
information wasn’t going to get out to the public, in this day and information age that we live in,”
Modly told the crew, “then he was either A too naïve or too stupid to be a commanding officer of a
ship like this … the alternative is that he did this on purpose.”42) These comments drew fierce
backlash, and on April 7 Modly resigned.43) Joe Biden, at the time on the verge of becoming the
presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, stated in an interview a few days after Crozier was
relieved of command : “I think it’s close to criminal the way they’re dealing with this guy … I
think the guy should … have a commendation rather than be fired.”44) Secretary of Defense Mark
Esper, however, had noted on the previous day that “the Navy has a culture of swiftly and
decisively removing captains if they lose confidence in them.”45) Then on April 24, it was reported
that Adm. Mike Gilday was recommending that Crozier be reinstated as the Roosevelt’s captain.46)
However, after a lengthy and thorough investigation, Gilday announced that Crozier would not be
reinstated to command after all, stating : “had I known then what I know today, I would not have
made that recommendation to reinstate Capt. Crozier … if Capt. Crozier were still in command
today, I would be relieving him.”47) All told, this incident not only reveals how widespread
coronavirus infections in the United States can affect actual military operations, but also how
vulnerable military decisions are to the partisan divide and political turmoil gripping the country at
the moment.
V. Analysis : The Impact on the U.S. Presence in East Asia
The radical transformation taking place in the United States could prove especially significant
for East Asia, where for over half a century, the Korean War and Vietnam War notwithstanding, the
U.S. presence in the region has served as a stabilizing force. While multiple areas in East Asia raise
security concerns, such as the Korean peninsula, there is perhaps no issue of greater regional
importance than China’s growing economic and military power. In terms of military power, a 2020
U.S. Secretary of Defense report highlights how China has already surpassed the United States in
several areas, most notably the following three.48) First, China has approximately 350 ships in its
navy’s battle force, whereas the United States has approximately 293 ships comprising its battle
force.49) Second, China now has over 1,250 ground­launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground­
launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which have ranges can that reach 5,500 kilometers, whereas the
United States currently has only a single conventional type of GLBM, with a range of up to 300
kilometers. Third, China fields one of the most sizeable forces of advanced long­range surface­to­air
systems in the world, which makes up a notable part of its “robust and redundant integrated air
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defense system architecture.”50) The report also notes that China has anti­access/area­denial (A2/AD)
capabilities that currently stand as “the most robust within the First Island Chain,” and it aims to
bolster these capabilities farther into the Pacific Ocean.51) As such, even though the United States
currently demonstrates military superiority in other areas, and fields a more advanced and potent
military force overall, the reality is that China continues to close in on U.S. military capabilities by
rapidly developing its land, air, naval, and nuclear forces so that the country will have a “world­
class” military by 2049.52)
With concerns growing that China could potentially use its rapidly developing military force in
relation to its territorial claims in the region, the United States has taken proactive measures, most
notably in the South China Sea, where China has created new islands and constructed bases, and
where China has competing territorial claims with several countries, including Vietnam and the
Philippines.53) The United States has, for instance, increased the frequency of its Freedom of
Navigation Operations, with nine such operations in 2019 in the South China Sea.54) Moreover, in
response to a statement in the Global Times that China has a wide selection of “aircraft carrier
killer” missiles, and that U.S. carriers traversing the area “is at the pleasure of the” People’s
Liberation Army,55) Defense Secretary Esper stated that “American carriers have been in the South
China Sea and the Indo Pacific since World War II, and we will continue to be there, and we’re not
going to be stopped by anybody.”56)
Similarly, there has been growing concern about the future of Taiwan, particularly following
the passage of Hong Kong’s new security law, and in light of Chinese warplanes crossing the
Taiwan Strait median line in August of 2020 when the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Alex Azar, visited Taiwan, and again in September of 2020 during U.S. Under Secretary
of State Keith Krach’s visit to Taiwan.57) Though the United States has no formal security alliance
with Taiwan, continued arms sales and military exercises in the region bolster the strength of
America’s strategic ambivalence approach with regard to Taiwan. For instance, in September of
2020, just as China had warplanes cross the Taiwan Strait median line, the United States engaged in
live­fire missile exercises that sank a decommissioned frigate as part of its Valiant Shield exercises,
which feature only U.S. military forces and take place every other year. In a particularly forceful
statement, Navy Capt. Steven DeMoss stated that “this exercise demonstrates our ability to bring
overwhelming fire power from the sea whether that comes from under the surface, on the surface, or
from the air,” and added that “we have this capability in every theatre of the globe and can employ
these weapons at the place and time of our choosing.”58)
The United States has also focused on countering China in other ways. It has been expanding
its security framework beyond the traditional hub­and­spokes system to include multilateral
arrangements, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, Australia, and India, which
resumed in 2017.59) U.S. agencies are also increasingly shifting toward dealing with China
specifically. For example, Defense Secretary Esper stated in 2020 that one of the Department of
Defense’s goals is to focus on China, which has resulted in a number of changes, including : a
newly created strategy management office that will integrate the Department’s efforts to deter
China ; the creation of a new policy office that is designed to counter China ; and a shift in the
National Defense University’s curriculum so that half of coursework focuses on China.60) By way of
another example, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray stated in a 2020
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speech that China’s “malign foreign influence” and intellectual property theft represent serious
threats to the United States, and added that nearly half of the FBI’s 5,000 active counterintelligence
cases relate to China, with the FBI “opening a new China­related case about every ten hours.”61)
Even though the United States has officially remained steadfast in its commitment to regional
security, and still fields the world’s preeminent military force, recent events domestically may leave
its allies in East Asia with a diminished security partner. The importance of the U.S. military to the
East Asia region has not simply been due to its raw power, but due to the perception that its
immense power under the command of a resolute political system could be called in to quash any
attempt to forcibly undermine the status quo. It is of course difficult to ascertain precisely how
much the U.S. military presence in East Asia actually factors into China’s decisions on how to
proceed with regard to territorial disputes. Maintaining the status quo irrespective of America’s
military capabilities may be China’s preferred option, given the diplomatic and economic fallout that
could arise from exercising military force to resolve such issues. On the other hand, if changing the
status quo is China’s preferred option and it has only avoided doing so due to the U.S. military’s
dominance in the region, then recent developments in the United States could increase China’s
willingness to assert its power in the region. In this latter case, the narrowing gap in military
capabilities between the United States and China, coupled with the relatively sudden outbreak of
widespread social unrest and turmoil from America’s current socio­political conditions and struggles
with COVID­19, raise the prospect that China could engage in a form of brinkmanship, believing
that the United States would not risk getting drawn into a military conflict over matters with no
direct ties to U.S. security interests, such as islands in the South China Sea. This perception, then,
that the United States might not actually respond militarily to the aforementioned territorial disputes
due to an unwillingness or inability to absorb the political and economic costs of armed conflict will
obviously make it more difficult for the U.S. military to credibly serve as a deterrent in the region.
A full­scale armed conflict between China and the United States seems highly unlikely, but as
what Graham Allison calls “Thucydides’s Trap” makes clear, however, war is possible when a rising
power threatens to displace an established power.62) This means that even though ongoing and future
conflicts between the United States and China will likely center on cyber capabilities, trade
relations, and influence in international organizations,63) the reality is that there is always the
possibility for miscalculations or mistakes to trigger a military confrontation. For instance, how
would China proceed if, despite U.S. shows of force in the region and tough talk by American
leaders, it were to interpret the previously discussed challenges that the United States has recently
been dealing with as a sign that America is actually neither willing nor able to absorb the costs of
fighting in a major conflict in East Asia? Would it embolden China to assert its claims in the South
China Sea by attempting to block U.S. carriers from engaging in Freedom of Navigation Operations,
or embolden it to turn away U.S. military aircraft conducting patrol operations in China’s air
defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea? If the United States were to react
militarily in such scenarios, it would mean that the U.S. domestic issues previously discussed
precipitated an armed confrontation that could have otherwise been avoided. If the United States
were to refuse to respond militarily in these scenarios, then the domestic challenges that America
has been dealing with would put it in a situation to have its credibility undermined, and some aspect
of the status quo would change in East Asia that might otherwise not have changed.
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IV. Conclusion
As this paper has shown, the Trump presidency has seemingly cracked open a foreign and
domestic policy pandora’s box that is ushering in a transformative period in American history, while
the rampant spread of SARS­CoV­2 in the United States has blown the lid of this proverbial
pandora’s box right off. President Trump’s demands with regard to allies may serve American
interests in a narrow way insofar as getting allies to contribute more to defense agreements may
yield minor fiscal benefits, but in the long run it may lead allies and adversaries alike to question
how committed the United States is to existing security agreements. After all, the fact that someone
who so vehemently challenged the basic world order that the United States itself largely crafted
could become president reinforces just how precarious international security agreements can be, and
this injects at least some degree of uncertainty about the reliability of U.S. alliances.
The Trump presidency has also seemingly fostered a socio­political climate that has led to
widespread protests and a wave of younger progressive candidates, which are collectively
challenging America’s centrist political system and effectively rejecting the status quo in U.S.
society and politics. While the emergence of a truly new America domestically may well lead to a
wide array of social justice benefits and may set the country on a path to resolving some of its
entrenched social and racial justice issues, this kind of change represents a shift away from the
country’s traditionally centrist politics, and thereby creates uncertainty about the future of U.S.
foreign policy and by extension the future of the liberal world order under American leadership. The
spread of SARS­CoV­2 and the resulting number of COVID­19 diagnoses in the United States has
compounded this uncertainty by not only adding a massive fiscal burden that will weigh on the
federal government budget for at least the next few years, even if American economy makes a quick
recovery, but by also highlighting how America’s socio­political environment has become so divided
that even when facing a severe crisis the country cannot pull together to generate the kind of unity
needed to overcome it quickly and efficiently.
A White House report released in 2020 states : “Guided by a return to principled realism, the
United States is responding to the CCP’s direct challenge by acknowledging that we are in a
strategic competition and protecting our interests appropriately.”64) A realist view stresses the
importance of military power in achieving deterrence, and the U.S. military has indeed continued to
demonstrate its strength by its words and actions. U.S. officials have firmly maintained that America
will rebuff any use of military force to change the status quo. Continued U.S. military exercises in
the region, along with broadening security commitments through multilateral arrangements, make it
clear that the U.S. is serious about its regional commitment. However, it is also vitally important to
project the political will and material capacity to absorb the costs of a military conflict. Even if the
American military still has the actual capability to defeat an adversary and leaders are genuinely
determined to fulfill treaty obligations, it does little good if an adversary is of the opinion that the
United States is ultimately unwilling or unable to absorb the political and economic costs of armed
conflict, since such an opinion can entice an adversary to engage in the kind brinkmanship that
raises the prospect of a miscalculation leading to armed conflict.
This is precisely how President Trump’s comments on alliances, along with the social unrest
relating to America’s unresolved racial justice issues, and the way that COVID­19 has impacted the
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U.S. economy and exacerbated the country’s political divide, can potentially invite doubts about the
efficacy of the United States military presence in East Asia as a deterrent to an adversary using
force to change the status quo. This means that negotiating fair burden­sharing agreements without
publicly disparaging allies, restoring some modicum of political stability by making progress on
issues relating to racial justice, and curbing the spread of the coronavirus and its impact on the U.S.
economy and society, are all vital aspects of America’s ability to serve as a military deterrent
abroad. These are of course significant challenges, but until the United States can at least partly
resolve them, they will fuel doubts about the country’s ability and willingness to absorb the political
and material costs of fully responding to an adversary’s attempt to use force to alter the status quo
in East Asia―which could result in the new America and its allies being forced to fight a conflict
that would have otherwise not started in the first place in a world guided by a pre­Trump, pre­
coronavirus America.65)
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